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I. INTRODUCTION

Ilena Rosenthal operates an internet discussion group.' She receives an
email from an acquaintance which contains defamatory, disparaging statements
about Dr. Terry Polevoy, who operates a website devoted to exposing health
frauds.2 Rosenthal reads this email and proceeds to spread the defamatory
statements online by posting them, not on her own discussion group website, but
rather on various health newsgroup websites, 3 impugning Dr. Polevoy's character and competence as a doctor and disparaging his efforts to combat fraud.4
Under any reasonable interpretation of the common law, Rosenthal would be
guilty of defamation.5 However, simply because Rosenthal provides an online
service, she is currently immune from prosecution for her actions in defaming
Dr. Polevoy. 6 This is because courts have interpreted Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), which was designed to protect internet service providers from liability for independent statements of third parties, to allow
anyone who operates a website to create and encourage defamatory statements
while flaunting the protection of Section 230.
Section 230 was designed to protect internet service providers from liability for screening offensive online materials and to simultaneously promote
self-regulation, so that free speech and the continued growth of the internet with
minimal governmental regulation could be achieved. 7 Thus, Section 230 functions by protecting internet service providers and other online entities from liability when they serve only as intermediaries for dissemination of third party
statements and when they act to restrict online access to objectionable material.8
However, courts have impermissibly broadened the scope of the protection provided by Section 230 so that internet service providers and other online entities
can now boast an almost absolute immunity from any civil cause of action.
"Unfortunately, courts are interpreting Section 230 so broadly as to provide too
Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 513 (Cal. 2006).
2

Id. at 514.

3
4

Id.

5

See

6

7

8

Id.at 513.
§ 558 (1977).
Barrett, 146 P.3d at 529.
141 CONG. REc. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2008); H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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much immunity, eliminating the incentive to foster a balance between speech
and privacy. The way courts are using
Section 230 exalts free speech to the de9
triment of privacy and reputation."
This Note seeks to rediscover the boundaries of Section 230 protection
that Congress intended when it enacted the CDA. Part II provides a background
of pre-Section 230 online defamation law and the Congressional intent behind
the enactment of Section 230. Part II reviews the seminal Section 230 case,
Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,' and its progeny. Finally, Part IV provides a
new look at the proper interpretation of Section 230. Part IV(A) proposes three
test cases, and asks whether Section 230 applies in these situations. Part V(B)
reveals broad generalizations made by the Zeran court and notes the effect that
these generalizations have had on the improper expansion of Section 230 protection. Part V(C) analyzes Section 230 to rediscover the proper boundaries of
protection that are consistent with both the text of the statute and Congressional
intent, and concludes that Section 230 does not protect users and providers of
internet services if they alter, manipulate, select, or facilitate objectionable third
party content, unless the user or provider is acting in good faith to restrict the
objectionable content.
II. BACKGROUND

A.

Cubby and Stratton Oakmont: The Pre-Section 230 Paradox

Section 230 was enacted to eliminate the paradoxical result of two
1990s internet-based defamation cases, one of which found an internet service
provider to be a publisher of third party defamatory statements and therefore
liable, and the second of which found an internet service provider to be a distributor and therefore not liable." A key distinction exists at common law between "publishers" and "distributors" for the purpose of finding secondary defamation liability. 12 A "publisher" is an entity, such as a book or newspaper
publisher, which is responsible for the creation and/or editing of content in a
publication. 13 If the defendant in a defamation suit is considered a publisher, the
plaintiff does not need to prove that the defendant knew of the specific utterance

9

DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE

159 (2007).
129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
Steven M. Cordero, Comment, Damnum Absque Injuria: Zeran v. AOL and Cyberspace

INTERNET

1o

H

Defamation Law, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 775, 792 (1999); see also Doe v.

America Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1014 (Fla. 2001); David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and
the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act upon Liabilityfor Defamation on
the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REV. 147, 159-60 (1997).
12 Sheridan, supra note 11, at 154.
13

Id.
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that is the subject of the suit for the defendant to be held liable.' 4 A "distributor," on the other hand, is an entity, such as a bookstore or library, which makes
publications available to the public.' 5 If the defendant in a defamation suit is
considered a distributor, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew, or6had
reason to know, of the specific utterance for the defendant to be held liable.'
1.

Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc.: Internet Service Providers
Are Not Liable for Defamatory Statements of Third Parties If
They Do Not Monitor Online Content

The first of the two internet-based defamation cases, decided in 1991 by
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, was Cubby, Inc.
v. Compuserve, Inc.17 Cubby involved allegedly defamatory statements made in
the electronic publication Rumorville, which was available to approved Compuserve subscribers in the "Journalism Forum," one of Compuserve's many electronic bulletin boards.1 8 The statements were made against Skuttlebut, an electronic publication developed to compete with Rumorville.19 The developers of
Skuttlebut accused Compuserve of libel, alleging that Compuserve was the publisher of the defamatory statements.2 ° In response, Compuserve argued that it
acted only as a distributor of the statements, and that it therefore could not be
held liable because it did not know or have reason to know of the statements. 2 1
The court, noting that Compuserve did not review the contents of Rumorville
before it was uploaded and made available to subscribers, 22 compared Compuserve to traditional news vendors and found that the appropriate standard of
liability to be applied in the case was distributor liability. 23 Thus, since Compuserve did not know or have reason to know of the allegedly defamatory24 statements, summary judgment was granted to Compuserve on the libel claim.

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May

24, 1995); see also Sheridan, supra note 11.
17
776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
18

Id. at 137.

19

Id. at 138.

20

Id.
Id.

21

23

Id.at 137.
Id. at 140-41.

24

Id. at 141.

22
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2.

Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.: Internet Service Providers Are Liable for Defamatory Statements of Third
Parties if They Screen Online Content for Objectionable Material

Four years later, a New York State Supreme Court decided Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co. 25 Similar to the facts of Cubby, Stratton
Oakmont involved allegedly defamatory statements made by an unidentified
user about Stratton Oakmont, an investment banking firm, on the Prodigy electronic bulletin board "Money Talk., 26 Stratton Oakmont sued Prodigy for libel.27 Again similar to Cubby, Stratton Oakmont argued that Prodigy was a
publisher, and Prodigy argued that it was simply a distributor.28 The Stratton
Oakmont court, however, reached a different conclusion than the Cubby court.
It looked to Prodigy's stated claims of being a family oriented computer network and "an online service that exercised editorial control over the content of
messages posted on its computer bulletin boards, 29 to distinguish Prodigy from
Compuserve in Cubby and find Prodigy liable as a publisher. 30 In coming to
this conclusion, the court listed evidence supporting its finding of publisher liability, including promulgation of "content guidelines," use of bulletin board
31
"leaders" to enforce the guidelines, and use of a software screening program,
all of which were utilized to screen and prevent objectionable material.
The Stratton Oakmont holding created an interesting, paradoxical
choice for internet service providers such as Compuserve, Prodigy, and America
Online. If they attempted to monitor the content being posted on their bulletin
boards and forums to create a safe, family friendly environment, they would be
subject to liability for defamation. However, if they simply made no effort to
control content, they would not be subject to liability. 32 Considering the massive amount of content that is transmitted through internet service providers
each day,33 the result of the Stratton Oakmont / Cubby paradox was that service
providers had no incentive to monitor online content. Instead, by simply refusing to monitor content, the service providers could enjoy a practical immunity
from liability and not have to endure the enormous cost of monitoring content
closely enough to catch and remove all defamatory statements.
25
26

1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
Id. at * 1.

29

Id.
Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *2.

30

Id. at *4.

31

Id. at *2.

32

Sheridan, supra note 11,

27
28

at 159.

For the quarter ending December 31, 2008, AOL reported 54 billion domestic page views,
as well as an average of 109 million visitors per month, for the AOL networks. AOL Corporate
Company Overview, http://corp.aol.com/about-aol/company-overview (last visited Feb. 8, 2009).
33
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Enactment of Section 230

Congress recognized and sought to rectify the situation caused by Stratton Oakmont, which subjected internet service providers to liability for taking
actions to monitor and restrict objectionable online material, 34 by including the
CDA as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 35 Section 230 of the CDA
was enacted to provide "Good Samaritan" protections for responsible internet
service providers that take actions to monitor and restrict access to objectionable
online material. 36 As stated by Representative Cox, a co-author of the law, Section 230 was designed to do two things:
First, it... protect[s] computer Good Samaritans, online service
providers, anyone who provides a front end to the Internet,....
who takes steps to screen indecency and offensive material for
their customers. It ...

protect[s] them from taking on liability

such as occurred in [Stratton Oakmont] that they should not
face for helping us and for helping us solve this problem.
Second, it

. .

. establish[es] as the policy of the United States

that we do not wish to have content regulation by the Federal
Government of what is on the Internet... because frankly the
Internet has grown up 37to be what it is without that kind of help
from the Government.
In other words, Section 230 was enacted (1) to prevent interactive computer
services ("ICSs"), including internet service providers and other services, 38 from
being subjected to publisher liability for screening objectionable material and
(2) to encourage self-regulation, in order to promote free speech and the continued growth of the internet with minimal governmental regulation.39
See H.R. RaP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. No. 104-230, at 194 (1996)
(Conf. Rep.).
35
See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
36
H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194; S. REP. No. 104-230, at 194.
37
141 CONG. REc. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
34

"Interactive computer service" is defined as "any information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems
operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)
(2008).
39
Representative Cox noted during Congressional proceedings that the minimal governmental
regulation approach of Section 230 would work more effectively than proposed laws that promoted governmental regulation of the internet. He also noted that Section 230 would remove
disincentives to ICSs to screen objectionable content:
Some have suggested, Mr. Chairman, that we take the Federal Communications Commission and turn it into the Federal Computer Commission, that we
hire even more bureaucrats and more regulators who will attempt, either civil38
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To achieve these goals, Section 230 provided protection in two ways.
First, subsection (c)(1) was enacted to overrule Stratton Oakmont and any similar decision that treated ICSs as publishers or speakers of content not their
own.4° Subsection (c)(1) thus states that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider. ' 4 1 Second, subsection (c)(2)
was enacted to provide immunity from civil liability for actions voluntarily taken by providers or users of ICSs to restrict access to or availability of objectionable online material.42
To summarize, Section 230 provides two functions. First, it protects
ICSs from liability when they act only as intermediaries for dissemination of
third party statements.43 Second, it immunizes actions by ICSs to restrict access
to objectionable online material. 44
ly or criminally, to punish people by catching them in the act of putting something into cyberspace. Frankly, there is just too much going on on the Internet
for that to be effective. No matter how big the army of bureaucrats, it is not
going to protect my kids because I do not think the Federal Government will
get there in time. Certainly, criminal enforcement of our obscenity laws as an
adjunct is a useful way of punishing the truly guilty. Mr. Chairman, what we
want are results. We want to make sure we do something that actually works.
Ironically, the existing legal system provides a massive disincentive for the
people who might best help us control the Internet to do so .... We want to
encourage people like Prodigy, like CompuServe, like America Online, like
the new Microsoft network, to do everything possible for us, the customer, to
help us control, at the portals of our computer, at the front door of our house,
what comes in and what our children see.
141 CONG. REc. H8469-70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
40
H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) ("One of the specific purposes of this
section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have
treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because
they have restricted access to objectionable material."); S. Rep. No. 104-230, at 194.
41 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2008). An information content provider is "any person or entity that
is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service." Id. § 230(f)(3) (italics added).
42
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). This section, entitled "Civil liability," reads as follows:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on
account of- (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to
or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph
(1).
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). (Note that "paragraph (1)" is likely a typographic error, and should read
"subparagraph (A)." See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B) n. 1.).
43
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194; S.REP. No. 104-230, at 194.
44
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2); H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194; S.REP.No. 104-230, at 194.
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I. ZERAN V. AMERICA ONLINE, INC. AND ITS PROGENY

The Decision: Section 230 ProtectsICSs from both Publisherand DistributorStandards of Liability

A.

One year after the CDA became law, the seminal Section 230 case of
Zeran v. America Online, Inc. was decided by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.45 Zeran was a negligence action brought against America Online
("AOL") for failure to remove allegedly defamatory messages posted by an
anonymous user on an AOL bulletin board. 46 The messages advertised t-shirts
with various tasteless slogans related to the Oklahoma City bombing incident
and instructed interested buyers to contact "Ken" at Zeran's home phone number.47 As a result of this malicious prank, Zeran began to receive a high volume
of angry and derogatory phone calls and messages, including several death
threats.48 Zeran contacted AOL, and a company representative informed him
that the bulletin board message would be taken down but that AOL, as a matter
of policy, would not post a retraction. 49 AOL did indeed remove this posting,
but other similar anonymous messages were posted soon thereafter, and the
phone calls to Zeran's residence intensified.5 ° Zeran repeatedly contacted AOL
and was assured that the account through which the messages were being posted
was soon to be closed; however, he was continually harassed for a number of
weeks until the situation was finally resolved.51
In analyzing Zeran's negligence action against AOL, the court characterized the claim as Zeran seeking to hold AOL liable for the defamatory speech
of a third party. AOL had successfully asserted Section 230 as an affirmative
defense at the district court level, but Zeran argued that once he notified AOL of
the defamatory messages, AOL had a duty to promptly remove the messages,
notify AOL subscribers of the false nature of the messages, and screen future
messages for defamatory material.53 Zeran attempted to get around Section 230
by arguing that when Congress enacted Section 230, it used the term "publisher"
in subsection (c)(1) to immunize ICSs from publisher liability (the standard imposed in Stratton Oakmont), but not from distributor liability (the standard imposed in Cubby).54 Thus, Zeran argued that once he notified AOL of the exis45
46

129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 328-29.

48

Id. at 329.
Id.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id. at 330.

53

Id.

54

Id. at 331-32; see 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2008).

47
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tence of defamatory statements on an AOL bulletin board, AOL could be held
liable as a distributor, because AOL had knowledge that the distributed material
was defamatory.55
The court, however, disagreed with Zeran. 56 The court found that publication is a required element to succeed in a defamation claim at common law,
and that the publisher and distributor categories are merely subsets of the publication element. 57 Noting that Stratton Oakmont and Cubby correctly state two
different standards of liability but do not suggest that distributors are not a type
of publisher, the court found AOL immune to Zeran's negligence action under
Section 230(c)( 1).58
The Progeny: Post-ZeranExpansion of Section 230

B.

Courts since Zeran have seized upon broad generalizations made in the
Zeran opinion 59 to grant almost absolute immunity to ICSs under Section
230(c)(1). For example, courts have allowed defendants who take an active role
in selecting and posting defamatory material to claim Section 230 immunity as
long as the material was originally written by someone else.6 ° In a 2003 Ninth
Circuit case, the defendant maintained a website and an electronic newsletter
about museum security and stolen art. 6 1 The defendant received an email from a
third party, who was also named as a defendant in the case, accusing the plaintiff of bragging about being the granddaughter of a Nazi and asserting that paintings in the plaintiff's house were stolen from Jewish people during World War
11.62 The defendant read this email and made the decision to include it in his
newsletter, because he viewed it as meriting distribution to his subscribers.6 3
The defendant then made alterations to the wording of the email and added a
message to it stating that the FBI had been informed of the content of the message. 64 The court dismissed the plaintiffs defamation claim, finding that the
defendant's alterations and choice to publish the email, while rejecting other
emails, did not cause the defendant to be classified as an information content

56

Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
Id. at 332.

57

Id.

58

Id. at 332, 335. This Note does not dispute the Zeran court's publisher / distributor conclu-

55

sion. See infra Part IV.B. 1.
59
See infra Part IV.B.2.
60
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal.
2006).
61
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1021.
62

Id.

63

Id. at 1021-22.

64

Id. at 1022.
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provider ("ICP"). 65 Thus, the court found the defendant protected by Section
230.66 The court stated that "the scope of [Section 230] immunity cannot turn
on whether the publisher approaches the selection process as one of inclusion or
removal, 6 7 effectively ignoring Section 230(c)(2), which does make this distinction. 68
Similarly, in a 2006 California state case, the defendant was an operator
of an internet discussion group. 69 Although many disparaging remarks about the
plaintiff were posted on the discussion group website by the defendant and others, the trial court found that the only actionable statement against the defendant
was in an article authored by a third party and emailed to the defendant. 70 The
defendant had proceeded to post a copy of this defamatory article, not on her
own website, but on the websites of two separate newsgroups, 71 and in doing so
impugned the plaintiff's character and competence as a doctor.72 Despite the
defendant's active role in selecting and posting the defamatory article to websites other than her own, the California Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the appellate court, finding the defendant protected by Section 230 as a distributor and considering only in passing whether the defendant was an ICP. 73 In so
doing, the court admitted that the defendant played an "active role in selecting
and posting material disparaging plaintiffs. 7 4 However, the court justified these
actions as protected by incorrectly stating that Section 230 acts to "broadly
shield[] all providers from liability for 'publishing' information received from
third parties., 75 Thus, these two cases broadened a "Good Samaritan" law, intended to encourage providers and users of ICSs to self-regulate and screen for

Id. at 1031. An ICS is outside of Section 230 protection if it is also an ICP for the statements in question. See infra notes 126-27127 and accompanying text.
66
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031.
67
Id. at 1032.
68
"Any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrictaccess to or availability of' objectionable material is immune from civil liability. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2008) (italics added).
69
Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 513 (Cal. 2006).
70
Id. at 514.
65

71
72

Id.
Id. at 513.

Id. at 528-29. Most of the California Supreme Court's analysis was aimed at rebutting the
reasoning of the Court of Appeals, which rejected Zeran and found distributors to be liable on a
notice basis and not protected by Section 230. Id. at 515-25. The California Supreme Court was
likely correct in rejecting the analysis of the Court of Appeals on this ground, see infra Part
IV.B. 1, but nevertheless should have affirmed the judgment on the grounds that the defendant was
an ICP and therefore not protected by Section 230(c)(1). See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
74
Barrett, 146 P.3d at 520.
75
Id. at 522 (italics in original).
73
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objectionable material,7 6 into a law that encourages providers and users of ICSs
to seek out and post objectionable materials without any fear of repercussions.
Another area in which courts have allowed defendants to claim Section
230 immunity is when they create "pre-prepared responses" to questions for
users to submit in questionnaires. In a 2003 Ninth Circuit case, the defendant
ran a commercial internet dating service.78 Members of the service, and those
who wanted to try out the service free of charge, created "profiles" by completing a required questionnaire which included over fifty questions, with answers
to those questions being selectable from a pull-down menu. 79 Some of the answers were innocuous, and some were sexually suggestive. 80 The defendant
used these questionnaires to classify user characteristics into discrete categories,
match profiles, and allow highly structured searches based on various user characteristics. 81 An unknown user created a free trial profile on the defendant's
service, falsely pretending to be the plaintiff, a popular actress.82 The unknown
user selected "Playboy/Playgirl" as the answer to the question "main source of
current events," and "looking for a one-night stand" as the answer to "why did
you call. 83 As a result, the plaintiff received numerous sexually suggestive
phone calls and eventually sued the defendant for defamation. 84 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the defendant was not an ICP, and was thus
protected under Section 230.85 In so finding, the court explicitly stated that
"[d]oubtless, the questionnaire facilitated the expression of information by individual users, 86 but then proceeded to ignore the statutory definition of an ICP
as "any person or entity that is responsible ...in part... for the development of
information.. ." over the internet. 87 Instead, the court impermissibly created a
new, higher standard for finding an entity to be ICP, requiring a "significantrole
in creating, developing or 'transforming' the relevant information. 88 Thus, the
court broadened a law designed to protect ICSs from being liable for indepen-

76

141 CONG. REc. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).

77

See generally Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1121.

78

79
80

Id.
Id.

82

Id. at 1124.
Id. at 1121.

83

Id.

84

Id. at 1122.

85

87

Id. at 1124-25.
Id. at 1124.
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2008) (italics added).

88

Carafano,339 F.3d at 1125.

81

86
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dent statements of third parties,89 transforming it into a law that protects ICSs
that put words into the mouths of those third parties.
Finally, although an ICS must be classified as a publisher or speaker of
third party content to be protected by subsection (c)(1) of Section 230, courts
have applied Section 230 to immunize ICSs from claims that are unrelated to
this classification. 90 An Eighth Circuit District Court, for example, using Section 230 to immunize an ICS, granted a motion to dismiss claims for negligent
failure to maintain proper and adequate records, negligent spoliation of evidence, intentional spoliation of evidence, aiding and abetting defamation, and
aiding and abetting interference with prospective business relationships. 9 1 The
court found that the complaint sought to treat the defendant as a publisher by
seeking to impose liability for the defendant's conduct in disseminating a third
party's online statements and by seeking to hold the defendant responsible for
allegedly defamatory material published by the third party. 92 However, the
court failed to look at each individual claim when deciding whether to treat the
defendant as a publisher, instead dismissing all claims as a group.93 The court
failed to realize that many of the claims, such as allegations of failure to maintain records, spoliation of evidence, and aiding and abetting defamation, were
aimed at the defendant's own acts and did not require that the defendant be
treated as a publisher for liability to be imposed. Similarly, a California state
appeals court immunized an ICS from claims alleging that it violated the state
"Autograph Sports Memorabilia" statute and was engaged in unfair business
practices because it failed to furnish certificates of authenticity.94 Despite the
fact that these claims would treat the defendant as a dealer, and not a publisher,
the court found Section 230 immunity.95
The courts' expansive view of Section 230 has effectively prevented the
CDA from working as Congress intended, to encourage ICSs to self-regulate
and restrict objectionable content. 96 Instead, the decisions of the courts have
effectively "license[d] professional rumor-mongers and gossip-hounds to spread

89

See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2); H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. No.

104-230, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
90
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
91 Patentwizard, Inc. v. Kinko's, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1070-71 (D.S.D. 2001).
92

Id. at 1071.

93

Id. at 1072.

See Gentry v. Ebay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
95 It should be noted that the court found the defendant in this case, Ebay, not liable under the
state dealer laws, but still proceeded to analyze Section 230 protection. Id. at 829. The fact that
Ebay would have properly won on the merits of the case demonstrates the fact that, although
Section 230 protection does not provide complete immunity, plaintiffs still have to prove their
cases, and ICSs such as Ebay are not doomed if they are not provided with absolute Section 230
immunity.
96
141 CONG. REc. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
94
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false and hurtful information with impunity." 97 This expansive view should be
reevaluated, and the proper boundaries of Section 230 need to be rediscovered
and implemented.
IV. A NEW LOOK AT SECTION 230 IMMUNITY
A.

Section 230 Test Cases-Does Section 230 Apply Here?

To illustrate the need for boundaries on Section 230 immunity, which
will ensure that interpretation of the law complies with the text of the statute and
with Congressional intent, consider the following situations. Consider a company that operates an online roommate matching service.9 8 Before subscribers
can use the service, they must create online profiles by filling out an online
questionnaire. These questionnaires require subscribers to disclose their sex,
sexual orientation, and willingness to bring children into a household, and then
to list their preferences in roommates with regard to the same three criteria. 99
The answers to these three criteria are selectable from "drop-down" and "selecta-box" menus prepared by the company. 1°° For example, prospective members
must indicate whether "Straight males," "Gay males," "Straight females," or
"Lesbian females," currently live in a household.10 1 They must then indicate
whether they are willing to live with "Straight or gay" males, "Straight" males
only, "Gay" males only, or "No males."10 2 The company then channels information based on members' answers so that other members can search the profiles of members with compatible preferences.10 3 When the company that operates the housing website is sued for violating the Fair Housing Act,1°4 is the
company immune from suit under Section 230?
Next, reconsider the situation posed at the beginning of this Note. A
website operator receives an email from a third party which contains defamatory, disparaging statements about another person. 0 5 The operator reads this
email and proceeds to spread the defamatory statements online by posting them
at various websites,10 6 and in doing so impugns the person's character and competence.10 7 Is the operator immune from suit under Section 230?
97
98
99

Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1038 (Gould, J., dissenting).
Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id.

'0o Id. at 1165.
101 Id.
102

Id.

103

Id. at 1162.

Id.
105 Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 513 (Cal. 2006).
104

106
107

Id. at 514.
Id. at 513.
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Finally, consider a college gossip website that actively solicits objectionable content with the promise of anonymity. 10 8 Postings on the website
"have devolved from innocuous tales of secret crushes to racist tirades and lurid
finger-pointing about drug use and sex, often with the alleged culprit identified
by first and last name."' 9 Sample titles of discussions on the website include
"most overrated person at duke," "HOTTEST ASIAN SORORITY CHICK,"
"GUYS WITH STDS!," and "Best BlowJ." 110 The website operator, rather than
seeking to restrict defamatory and objectionable material from being posted on
the website, encourages this material by flaunting its supposed Section 230 immunity and the anonymity of the internet. I1 l Is the operator of this website immune from suit under Section 230?
Under a proper reading of the law, all three defendants in the above situations are outside the boundaries of Section 230 protection. 112 The proper
boundaries of Section 230 immunity need to be rediscovered so that Section 230
can be allowed to fulfill the Congressional goals of preventing ICSs from being
subjected to liability for screening objectionable material and encouraging selfregulation. 113 These rediscovered boundaries would promote free speech and
14
the continued growth of the internet with minimal governmental regulation,

108

Jessica Bennett, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 17, 2007, available

at http://www.newsweek.com/id/74322 (discussing the website http://www.juicycampus.com,
which shut down on Feb. 5, 2009. See A Juicy Shutdown, http://juicycampus.blogspot.com/
2009/02/juicy-shutdown.html (Feb. 4, 2009, 11:47 EST)).
109 Id.
110 Daniel J. Solove, Juicy Campus: The Latest Breed of Gossip Website, CONCURRING
OPINIONS, Dec. 9, 2007, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/12/juicy-campusth.
html (discussing the website http://www.juicycampus.com, which shut down on Feb. 5, 2009. See
A Juicy Shutdown, http://juicycampus.blogspot.com/2009/02/juicy-shutdown.html (Feb. 4, 2009,
11:47 EST)).
III

Id.

112

See infra Part IV.D. The first two situations are actual cases that have been decided. In the

first case, the defendant was surprisingly unsuccessful in claiming Section 230 protection.

See

generally Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). However,
commentators who espouse the courts' broad immunity interpretation of Section 230 have questioned the Roommates.com decision. See Roommates.com Denied 230 Immunity by Ninth Circuit
En Banc (With My Comments), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/04/roommatescom
.de 1.htm (Apr. 3, 2008, 20:05 EST) ("Unfortunately, it's virtually impossible to articulate in
crystal-clear terms why Roommates.com crossed the line while many other websites with similar
user interactions still qualify for 230."). In the second case, the defendant successfully claimed
Section 230 protection. See generally Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006). The third
situation involves the activities of the website JuicyCampus.com, which shut down on Feb. 5,
2009. See A Juicy Shutdown, http:lljuicycampus.blogspot.coml2009102/juicy-shutdown.html
(Feb. 4, 2009, 11:47 EST). The third party content that the website promoted made the website
operator ripe for a defamation lawsuit, and the website operator would surely have claimed Section 230 immunity as a defense.
13
141 CONG. REc. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Wyden).
114

Id.
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while not allowing ICSs to take advantage of and manipulate a perceived limitless Section 230 immunity.
B.

The Broad Generalizationsof Zeran

The first step to rediscovering the proper boundaries of Section 230 protection is to analyze the cause of the current expansion. Thus, the broad generalizations made in the Zeran court's decision, which led to the expansion of Section 230, must be examined.
1.

The Zeran Holding Was Correct

The Zeran holding that Section 230 protects ICSs from being treated as
publishers or distributors of third party material is probably correct. As noted in
Zeran, the Second Restatement of Torts lists four elements required to create
liability for defamation, one of which is "fault amounting at least to negligence
on the part of the publisher."'" 5 The Restatement then notes that "one who only
delivers or transmits defamatory matter published by a third person is subject to
liability if, but only if, he knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character."'1 16 These statements clearly categorize the distributor standard of liability
as a subset of publisher liability. It is reasonable to infer from the Restatement
that one who delivers or transmits defamatory material and has knowledge of its
defamatory character would be viewed as a publisher, fulfilling the publisher
element of defamation liability. If the Zeran court had ruled the other way and
allowed a separate distributor standard of liability to survive Section 230, ICSs
would be in the same paradoxical situation as that following Cubby and Stratton
Oakmont, and would simply shut down their forums and chat rooms to avoid
notice and thus avoid liability, rather than endure the costs of investigating
every report of defamatory language. 117 Since Congress enacted Section 230 to
prevent this paradox and to encourage ICS self-regulation, in order to promote
free speech and the continued growth of the internet, Congress obviously intended8 to avoid an interpretation of the law that would lead to this same paradox."

115
116

117
118

§ 558(c) (1977) (italics added).
Id. § 581(1).
See infra Part IV.C.2.
141 CONG. REc. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox); see infra Part
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

IV.C.2. It should be noted that Congress explicitly endorsed the Zeran court's holding in later
legislation. See H.R. REP. No. 107-449, at 194 (2002).
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Broad Generalizations Made by the Zeran Court Were Incorrect, and Led to the Improper Expansion of Section 230

In interpreting Section 230, the Zeran court made several problematic
broad-sweeping statements regarding the "immunity" granted by subsection
(c)(1). 119 These statements have allowed other courts to interpret Section 230 as
granting ICSs virtually complete immunity from any civil cause of action, even
if the ICS was significantly and actively involved in the dissemination of allegedly defamatory materials. First, the court over-generalized subsection (c)(1)
by stating that it "creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would
make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user
of the service." 1 20 Second, it incorrectly stated that Section 230 "precludes
courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in
a publisher's role ... [by] seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions-such as deciding whether to
publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content .... ,, 21 By making this statement,
the Zeran court "include[d] conduct within the scope of immunity that conflicts
with statutory language." 1 22 Section 230 does not protect ICSs that are acting as
publishers with respect to traditional editorial functions. Instead, it protects
ICSs from being treated as publishers when they are not acting as publishers
but
1 23
are simply intermediaries for dissemination of third party information.
If Congress had intended to immunize ICSs from any cause of action
involving information originating with a third party user, or to immunize ICSs
acting as publishers with respect to traditional editorial functions,1 24 Congress
could have written Section 230(c)(1) to simply state: "[n]o provider or user of
an interactive computer service shall be treated as a publisher or speaker." By
stating that an ICS shall not be treated as a publisher or speaker "of any information provided by another information content provider,"125 Congress clearly
intended for there to be limits on the protection given to providers and users of
ICSs. However, courts analyzing Section 230 routinely ignore Congress's definition of an ICP to find ICSs immunized even if they alter, manipulate, select, or
facilitate third party content, simply because the content originated with the
third party. The courts should take a closer look at Section 230(c)(1) and the
way that Congress has defined ICPs to find boundaries to the Section 230 protection of providers and users of interactive computer services.
119

Note that subsection (c)(1) makes no mention of immunity, in stark contrast to the civil

immunity explicitly granted in subsection (c)(2). See 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1), (2) (2008).
120
Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
121

Id.

122

Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F. Supp.

2d 681,695 (N.D. I11. 2006).
123
See infra Part IV.C.3.
124
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
2

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2008).
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ProperBoundaries of Section 230 Protection

An ICS is outside of the protection of Section 230(c)(1) if it acts as an
ICP for the statements in question. 26 An ICP is "any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part,for the creation or development of information
'' 27
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service. ]
Thus, users and providers of ICSs are protected by Section 230(c)(1) against
liability as publishers or speakers if they are merely intermediaries for dissemination of third party information. 28 Users and providers of ICSs are, unfortunately, also protected by Section 230(c)(1) if they are made aware of objectionable material, such as defamatory comments, and do nothing to restrict the objectionable content.129 However, users and providers of ICSs are not protected
by Section 230(c)(1) if they alter, manipulate, select, or facilitate the objectionable third party information in question, although they are immune under Section 230(c)(2) if the alterations are made in good faith to restrict the objectionable content.1 30 Finally, users and providers of ICSs are not protected by Section
230(c)(1) against claims that do not seek to treat the user or provider as a pub13
lisher or speaker. '
1.

ICSs Are Protected by Section 230(c)(1) from Liability As Publishers or Speakers If They Are Merely Intermediaries for Dissemination of Third Party Information, and by Section
230(c)(2) When Acting to Restrict Objectionable Content

The situations in which providers and users of ICSs are most deserving
of Section 230 protection are when they are unaware of third party information
provided to the ICS, or when they attempt to restrict objectionable third party
information provided to the ICS. These situations go to the core of the functions
Congress intended Section 230 to perform: protecting ICSs from Stratton Oak-

126 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000) ("Defendants concede that
..an [ICS] could also act as an [ICP] by participating in the creation and development of information, and thus not qualify for § 230 immunity."); Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816,
833 n.11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) ("It is not inconsistent for eBay to be an [ICS] and also an [ICP];
the categories are not mutually exclusive. The critical issue is whether eBay acted as an [ICP]
with respect to the information that appellants claim is false or misleading.").
127 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (italics added).
128
See infra Part V.C. 1.
129

See infra Part IV.C.2.

130

See infra Part IV.C.3; see also infra Part IV.C.I.
See infra Part IV.C.4.

131
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mont-like liability for independent statements of third parties, 3332 and immunizing actions by ICSs to restrict access to objectionable material.
For example, in Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online Inc., the
plaintiffs sued AOL for defamation and negligence based on inaccurate stock
quotes published in the AOL "Quotes & Portfolios" service area.' 34 The stock
information was supplied by two independent third parties, who alone created
the stock information posted in the service area.' 35 AOL's sole participation
was in occasionally removing inaccurate stock quotes to correct errors and in
contacting the third parties to request changes to inaccurate information when
these inaccuracies came to its attention. 36 The court, finding no evidence that
AOL participated in the creation of the stock information, properly held AOL
to
37
be protected by Section 230 from the claims of defamation and negligence.
Similarly, in Blumenthal v. Drudge, a D.C. District Court case, the
plaintiffs sued AOL for defamation based on a false report posted on AOL by a
gossip columnist. 138 AOL was unaware of the defamatory nature of the report
until notified by the columnist, who had received a letter from plaintiffs counsel. 139 AOL immediately posted the columnist's retraction, and later removed
the report from its electronic archive. 14° The court, finding no evidence that
AOL had any role in creating or developing any of the information in the report,
held that AOL was protected from defamation liability under Section 230.'14
These cases are excellent examples of plaintiffs trying to hold ICSs responsible as publishers of independent third party content, which is barred by
Section 230(c)( 1),142 and trying to hold ICSs responsible for actions to remove
material that the ICSs viewed as objectionable, which is barred by Section
230(c)(2). 143 It is unreasonable to expect a provider or user of an ICS, such as
AOL, to monitor all information conveyed through the ICS for fear of defamation liability. It is equally as unreasonable to hold an ICS liable when it acts
responsibly and restricts objectionable material. Finding ICSs liable for inaccurate stock quotes or disparaging gossip independently provided by third parties
and subsequently removed by the ICSs would, similar to the pre-Section 230
132

See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. No.

104-230, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
133
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2); H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194; S. Rep. No. 104-230, at 194.
134

206 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 2000).

135

Id. at 986.

136

Id. at 985.
Id. at 986.

137
138

992 F. Supp. 44, 47-48 (D.D.C. 1998).

139

Id. at 48.

140

Id.

141

Id. at 50-53.

142

See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2008).

143

Id. § 230(c)(2).
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situation, have a profoundly chilling effect on the growth of the internet. Congress desired that ICSs be immune in these situations, in order to allow the in44 and to remove disincentives for ICSs to restrict objectionaternet to flourish'
4
1
ble materials.
2.

ICSs Are Protected by Section 230(c)(1) If They Are Notified
of Third Party Defamatory Statements but Do Not Act

"While Congress could have made a different policy choice, it opted not
to hold interactive computer services liable for their failure to edit, withhold ' or
46
restrict access to offensive material disseminated through their medium."'
This is a correct interpretation of Section 230, based on Congress's stated goals
and Zeran's rejection of the distributor standard of liability. Although this middle ground is admittedly uncomfortable and undesirable, the alternative, requiring ICSs to act when they receive notice and holding them liable for failure to
do so, would fly in the face of the Congressional goal of encouraging selfregulation, in order to promote free speech and the continued growth of the intemet. 47 As the Zeran court correctly noted:
[N]otice-based liability would deter service providers from regulating the dissemination of offensive material over their own
services. Any efforts by a service provider to investigate and
screen material posted on its service would only lead to notice
of potentially defamatory material more frequently and thereby
create a stronger basis for liability. Instead of subjecting themselves to further possible lawsuits, service 48providers would likely eschew any attempts at self-regulation.1
Thus, a notice-based liability interpretation of Section 230 would have
the same result as that under the pre-Section 230 Cubby / Stratton Oakmont paradox: ICSs would either simply shut down their forums and chat rooms, in
order to avoid notice and thus avoid liability, or they would employ monitors to
restrict speech with an incredible severity, taking down every piece of information that could remotely be considered defamatory, in order to insure that there
was no chance that they would be held liable. 49 Given the massive amount of
content that is transmitted through ICSs every day, 150 ICSs would be likely to
144

47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4).

145

Id. § 230(b)(4).

146

Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998).
141 Cong. Rec. H8460-01, H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).
Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997).

147
148

149

See Dimeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528 (E.D. Pa. 2006).

150

See supra note 33.
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shut down their forums and chat rooms to avoid notice and thus avoid liability
rather than endure the costs of investigating every report of defamatory language. Congress enacted Section 230 to overcome the profoundly chilling effect of the Stratton Oakmont / Cubby paradox and promote self-regulation. 5'
Section 230 cannot be interpreted in a way that results in this same chilling effect and a lack of self-regulation.
3.

ICSs Are Not Protected by Section 230(c)(1) If They Alter,
Manipulate, Select, or Facilitate the Third Party Information in
Question

Several unduly broad-sweeping statements by the Zeran court 52 have
allowed other courts to incorrectly interpret Section 230(c)(1) as granting ICSs
virtually complete immunity from any civil cause of action, even if the ICS was
significantly and actively involved in the dissemination of allegedly defamatory
materials. The fallacies of the Zeran court's statements with regard to altering
and manipulating third party content are clearly explained by a Seventh Circuit
District Court:
Zeran holds that ICSs are immune from suit whenever they exercise the duties of a (professional) publisher by "alter[ing] content." In so holding, Zeran includes conduct within the scope of
immunity that conflicts with statutory language. By altering
content, an [ICS] would no longer be posting information provided by "another content provider" - a prerequisite under Section 230(c)(1).' 53
Section 230 does not protect ICSs that are acting as publishers with respect to traditional editorial functions, as the Zeran court assumed.15 4 Instead, it
protects ICSs from being treatedas publishers when they are not acting as publishers but are simply intermediaries for dissemination of third party information. 55 A proper interpretation of Section 230(c)(1) is that it protects an ICS
only when the ICS takes no active role in altering,
manipulating, selecting, or
15 6
facilitating the third party content in question.

151
152

141 Cong. Rec. H8460-01, H8469-70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).
See supra Part IV.B.2.

153
Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F. Supp.
2d 681, 695 (N.D. 1I. 2006).
154
See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
155
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2008) ("No provider or user of an interactive service shall be
treated as the publisher .... "). Of course, when an ICS is pursuing traditional editorial functions,
it is immunized for those actions taken to restrictobjectionable content. See id. § 230(c)(2).
156
See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1038 (Gould, J., dissenting).
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Section 230(c)(1) requires courts to evaluate whether an ICS is also an

ICP for the statements in question; thus, based on the definition of ICP, courts
are required to "consider whether a party 'is responsible, in whole or in part,for
the creation or development of information. ' "1 57 Several courts have managed
to ignore the plain language definition of ICP, thereby improperly broadening
the protection of Section 230(c)(1). For example, when an ICS reads an email
sent to him and makes the decision to edit it and include it in his newsletter because he views it as meriting distribution to his subscribers, 158 the ICS is also an
ICP and thus not protected under Section 230(c)(1). The ICS is "responsible...
in part, for the ... development" of the information, 59 and thus is an ICP, because the selection and editing of the email "add the [ICS's] imprimatur" to the
email, such that the email is transformed, bolstered, and strengthened to do more
harm if wrongful.1 60 Similarly, an ICS that creates "pre-prepared responses" for
users to submit to the ICS,16 1 cannot claim Section 230(c)(1) protection because,
third parties, it is "responsible
by effectively putting words in the mouths of the
162
.. in part, for the creation" of the information.
Courts frequently manage to confuse the proper interpretation of Section 230(c)(1) by claiming that altering, manipulating, or editing content is the
type of behavior that Congress sought to encourage when it enacted Section
230, and that this behavior must always be protected, regardless of the type of
alteration or manipulation that is being done. 163 This argument ignores the existence of Section 230(c)(2). Section 230(c)(2) explicitly provides civil immunity
for any action taken to restrict access to objectionable materials.' 64 Thus, good
faith editing, alteration, or manipulation of third party content in order to restrict
or remove offensive material is clearly immune under Section 230(c)(2), while
editing, alteration, or manipulation of third party content in order to facilitate or
encourage offensive material is not protected by either Section 230(c)(1) or
MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 2004 WL 833595, at *10 n.12 (N.D. Tex.
157
Apr. 19, 2004) ("[T]he statute does not require a court to determine only whether a party creates
or develops the information at issue. Being responsible for the creation or development of the
information is sufficient."); see 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
158
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146
P.3d 510, 514 (Cal. 2006).
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
159
dissenting).
160
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1038-39 (Gould, J.,
See generally Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
161
162
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3); see MCW, Inc., 2004 WL 833595, at *10 n.12 (criticizing Carafano,
339 F.3d 1119).
163
Dimeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523, 530 (E.D. Pa. 2006) ("If 'development of information'
carried the liberal definition that [plaintiff] suggests, then § 230 would deter the very behavior that
Congress sought to encourage. In other words, § 230(c)(1) would not protect services that edited
or removed offensive material."); Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031 ("[A] central purpose of the Act was to
protect from liability service providers and users who take some affirmative steps to edit the material posted.").
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2008).
164
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(c)(2). In other words, when an ICS chooses to perform editorial functions and
republishes content online that originated with a third party, the basis of the
ICSs immunity is the ICSs intent. The ICS is outside of Section 230(c)(1) protection, because it is "responsible ...in part, for the ... development" of the
information. 165 However, if the editorial functions were performed in good faith
to restrict objectionable content, the ICS is immune under Section 230(c)(2).
Proper interpretation of Section 230 serves to promote the selfregulation and Good Samaritan screening goals of Congress when it enacted
Section 230, while not allowing ICSs that encourage rumor-mongers and gossip-hounds and that promote objectionable material to thrive by brandishing the
current broad immunity interpretation of Section 230.166
4.

ICSs Are Not Protected by Section 230(c)(1) Against Claims
that Do Not Treat the ICS as a Publisher or Speaker

"Section 230(c)(1) does not bar 'any cause of action,' as Zeran holds..
but instead is more limited-it bars those causes of action that would require
treating an ICS as a publisher of third party content."'' 67 The protection provided by Section 230(c)(1) is not so limited as to only apply to defamation
claims, of course. For example, when multiple third-party users access a website and post allegedly discriminatory housing notices, the provider of the website is protected by Section 230(c)(1) against liability under the Fair Housing
Act, because holding the provider liable would treat the provider of the website
as the publisher of the housing notices. 168 Similarly, an ICS accused of tortuous
interference with contractual relations because it refused to remove material
deemed objectionable by the169plaintiffs from its online discussion groups is protected by Section 230(c)(1).
However, when an ICS is accused of fraud and negligent misrepresentation in its operation of online dating services, Section 230 protection does not
apply.170 Similarly, when an ICS is accused of negligent failure to maintain
proper and adequate records, negligent spoliation of evidence, intentional spoliation of evidence, aiding and abetting defamation, and aiding and abetting interference with prospective business relationships,' 71 Section 230 protection
165

47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).

16
167

See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1038 (Gould, J., dissenting); SoLOVE, supra note 9.
Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F. Supp.

2d 681, 693 (N.D. I11.2006).
168 Id. at 698.
169 Novak v. Overture Serv., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). Unfortunately,
based on a Congressional policy decision, Section 230(c)(1) does not protect ICSs for refusing to
remove objectionable material. However, this policy is better than the alternative notice-based
liability. See supra Part IV.C.2.
170 See generally Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
171 Patentwizard, Inc. v. Kinko's, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1070-71 (D.S.D. 2001).
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should not apply. Congress worded Section 230(c)(1) to protect ICSs only from
172
being treated as publishers or speakers of independent third party content;
Congress did not provide
complete immunity from all civil causes of action
73
under Section 230(c)(1).1
D.

ProperApplication of Section 230

Recall the three situations posed previously as test cases. The first situation is an online roommate matching service which requires prospective members to fill out online questionnaires with answers selectable from drop-down
menus, 174 and then channels this information so that other members can search
only the profiles of compatible members. 175 Second is a website operator who,
in taking an active role in selecting and choosing what materials to post on the
76
website, reads a defamatory email and proceeds to post its contents online.
The final situation is a website that actively solicits defamatory and objectionable material by flaunting its supposed Section 230 immunity and the anonymity
of the internet. 177 Under a proper interpretation of Section 230, none of these
ICSs can claim immunity.
The first situation is the recently decided Roommates.com case. 178 Surprisingly, the Roommates.com court did properly find the website not protected
by Section 230.179 The court recognized that "by requiring subscribers to provide.., information as a condition of accessing its service, and by providing a
limited set of pre-populated answers, Roommate[s.com] becomes much more
than a passive transmitter of information provided by others; it becomes the
developer, at least in part, of that information."' 180 Indeed, this case should not
have been difficult to decide. Since the ICS created "pre-prepared responses"
and required users to submit them, it cannot claim Section 230(c)(1) protection. 181 By effectively putting words in the mouths of the third parties, the ICS
is "responsible . . .in part, for the creation or development" of the information. 182 In so ruling, however, the Roommates.com court refused to admit the
172

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2008).

173 Note the absence of the words "civil liability" in Section 230(c)(1), but the presence of those

same words in Section 230(c)(2). See 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1), (2).
174 Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008).
175 Id. at 1162.
176
Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 514, 520 (Cal. 2006).
177

SOLOVE, supra note 9.

178

521 F.3d 1157.

179 Id. at 1175.
180
Id. at 1166.

181 See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
182 47 U.S.C. § 230(0(3); see MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 2004 WL 833595,
at *10 n.12 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004) (criticizing Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d
1119 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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errors of its rulings in Batzel and Carafano, instead feebly attempting to distinguish these decisions. 183 Additionally, the court attempted to narrowly tailor its
ruling, improperly focusing on the "illegal content" of the website. 84 The focus
of a Section 230 inquiry cannot be on the illegality of the website content; this
issue can be decided only after an ICS is found to be not protected by Section
230. Thus, while the Roommates.com decision is a step in the right direction,
the courts still have a long way to go in recognizing the proper scope and interpretation of Section 230 protection.
The second situation is the Barrett decision. 185 Here, when the ICS took
an active role in deciding to publish defamatory material online, it should have
lost its Section 230 protection. The ICS was "responsible ... in part, for the...
development" of the information, 186 and thus was an ICP, because the active
selection and posting of the material "add[ed] the [ICS's] imprimatur" to the
material, such that the material was transformed, bolstered, and strengthened to
do more harm. 187 It is noted that this view would also cause ICSs that screen
content responsibly, in order to restrict defamatory and objectionable materials,
to lose protection under Section 230(c)(1). However, ICSs that do this can
claim immunity under Section 230(c)(2), for "any action voluntarily taken in
good faith to restrict access to or availability of' objectionable material. 88
Thus, under this view, ICSs are encouraged to screen in order to restrict objectionable content but cannot flaunt their Section 230 immunity by reposting defamatory third party materials. This promotes
Congress's goal in enacting Sec189
tion 230 of encouraging self-regulation.
The third situation is based on the activities of the website JuicyCampus.com, which shut down on February 5, 2009.190 Operators of websites similar to JuicyCampus.com, who encourage defamatory and objectionable postings
on their websites by flaunting their supposed Section 230 immunity and the
183

See 521 F.3d at 1170-72. For a discussion of the Carafano and Batzel cases, see supra

notes 61-68, 77-89, and 158-62 and accompanying text. The Roommates.com court did at least
admit that language used in the Carafano decision was overly broad, and "disavow[ed] any suggestion that Carafanoholds an information content provider automaticallyimmune so long as the
content originated with another information content provider." 521 F.3d at 1171 n.31.
184
Id. at 1175 ("The message to website operators is clear: If you don't encourage illegal content, or design your website to require users to input illegal content, you will be immune."). It is
shocking that the court would declare the content of the website in Roommates.com "illegal,"
presumably for violating the Fair Housing Act, when the actual issue of illegality under the Fair
Housing Act had not yet been decided. See id. (remanding the case for the district court to decide
whether the website in question violated the Fair Housing Act).
185 Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006).
186
47 U.S.C. § 230(0(3).
187
'9

189

190

Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould, J., dissenting).
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A); see supra Parts IV.C.1, IV.C.3.
141 Cong. Rec. H8460-01, H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).
See A Juicy Shutdown, http://juicycampus.blogspot.com/2009/02/juicy-shutdown.html

(Feb. 4, 2009, 11:47 EST).
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anonymity of the internet,' 9' lose Section 230 protection. By encouraging and
facilitating defamatory and objectionable material, they are "responsible ... in
part, for the creation" of the material, and thus are ICPs.1 92 By following the
plain language of Section 230 and holding gossip websites such as JuicyCampus.com liable for encouraging defamatory material, courts would restore the
balance between freedom of speech and privacy that has been lost in the wake
of so many improperly broad interpretations of Section 230.193
V. CONCLUSION

Section 230 was designed to protect internet service providers from liability for screening offensive online materials and to simultaneously promote
self-regulation, so that free speech and the continued growth of the internet with
minimal governmental regulation could be achieved. 94 Section 230 provides
two functions. First, it protects ICSs from liability when they act only as intermediaries for dissemination of third party statements. 95 Second, it immunizes
actions by ICSs to restrict access to objectionable material. 96 Section 230
should not be interpreted to allow ICSs to put words in the mouths of third parties, to seek out and post defamatory and objectionable material, and to encourage and facilitate defamatory and objectionable material without any fear of
repercussion.
Congress did not want this new frontier to be like the Old West:
a lawless zone governed by retribution and mob justice. The
CDA does not license anarchy. A person's decision to disseminate the rankest rumor or most blatant falsehood should not escape legal redress merely because the person chose to disseminate it through the Internet rather than through some other medium.197
Congress intended Section 230 to have limits. Under Section 230(c)(1),
ICSs are not protected if they alter, manipulate, select, or facilitate the third party information in question. ICSs also are not protected by Section 230(c)(1)
against claims that do not treat the ICS as a publisher. However, when an ICS is
acting in good faith to restrict or prevent objectionable content, these actions
will always be immunized from suit by Section 230(c)(2). If Section 230 is
191 See Bennett, supra note 108.
192 47 U.S.C. § 230(f(3).
193 See SOLOVE, supra note 9.
194
195
196
197

141 Cong. Rec. H8460-01, H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194; S. Rep. No. 104-230, at 194.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2); H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194; S. Rep. No. 104-230, at 194.
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould, J., dissenting).
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correctly interpreted as having boundaries, it will work the way that Congress
intended, promoting free speech and self-regulation on the internet, while not
allowing ICSs that encourage rumor-mongers and gossip-hounds and that promote objectionable material to thrive by brandishing the current broad immunity
interpretation of Section 230.198
Thomas D. Huycke*

198

Id. at 1038; see SOLOVE, supra note 9.
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